On March 7, China unveiled a new Anti-Secession Law in its third session of the 10th National People’s Congress meeting. The law legalizes China to take military action against the renegade province, Taiwan. The full text of the Anti-Secession Law stated a three-point scenario for ‘‘non-peaceful action’’ against Taiwan. It says that China will attack Taiwan if the forces clamouring for Taiwan’s independence ‘‘under any name or by any means’’ create the ‘‘fact of Taiwan’s secession from China’’, if there is ‘‘occurrence of major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China’’ and if ‘‘possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted.’’
Taiwan has strongly opposed the Anti-Secession Law and called it as China’s ploy to annex Taiwan and unilaterally change the status quo. The pro-independent groups have opposed Chen Shui-bian’s moderate tone in Cross-Strait relations and demanded that the government should counter anti-secession law with an anti-annexation law, which would state that Taiwan is a sovereign country.
A careful reading of the full text of the Anti-Secession Law indicates that the proposal on taking non-peaceful means to stop Taiwan’s Secession from China by the Taiwan Independent force, comes in the fourth and the last section of the text. This is in tandem with China’s earlier positions on Taiwan reunification as codified in the 16th Party Congress Report of 2002. It vindicates China’s three positions on when to attack Taiwan that is if Taiwan declares independence, if there is foreign intervention in Cross-Strait relations and if there is indefinite postponement of re-unification goal.
Second, the section on Achieving National Reunification Through Peaceful Means, clearly points at the significance of peaceful reunification both for China and the world. It says, ‘‘A reunification by peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included, as it is conducive to fostering a warm affection among compatriots on both sides, to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’’ The draft proposal in fact, mentions a five-point formula to create peace and stability in the region and promote Cross-Strait relations.
Third, the full text does not mention any time-table for unification with Taiwan or for taking aggressive military action to thwart Taiwan from going independent. In fact, the law mandated that ‘‘the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan.’’
As against the legalization of use of force against Taiwan, the anti-secession law is basically meant to reinforce the status quo position on Cross- Strait relations. The three-point scenario for ‘‘non-peaceful action’’ is intended to thwart the pro-independent groups from campaigning for independence.
It is also intended to prevent Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian from enacting a new Constitution for Taiwan by 2008. China looks upon the revision of the Constitution as a declaration of Taiwan’s independence and unilateral change in the status quo. In February 2005, the US came out with a US-Japan joint statement indicating Taiwan as a common security concern for both countries. This joint statement is not directly linked with proposed Anti-secession Law, but against China’s increasing military power. It is meant to contain China’s rising influence in the region. The overall US policy on Cross-Strait relations is based on strategic ambiguity. This strategic ambiguity perpetrates status quo on Cross- Strait relations. Strategic ambiguity helps balance competing US interests in China and Taiwan, and maintain credibility, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
China, with its developmental nationalism and pragmatic foreign policy, is not supportive of military action against Taiwan. It will severely jeopardize China’s image building exercise as a responsible and peaceful power. More so, China’s development is contingent on the continuance of a stable economic world order. Its economy is increasingly intertwined with the world’s economic growth and therefore it is in China’s interests to maintain peace across the Straits. Therefore, present policy both in China and the US, is to maintain the status quo.
Further, the status quo position is increasingly becoming the hallmark of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan whose party ideology supports independence of Taiwan. In fact, Chen Shui-bian’s second Presidential inaugural speech reiterates that Taiwan would not declare independence, would not change the national title, would not insert two-state theory into Constitution, would not promote a referendum to change the status quo regarding independence or unification, and would not abolish the national unification guidelines. The February 2005 Chen-Soong 10-point joint statement also reflects a conciliatory position adopted by DPP and it is decreasing its aggressive pro-independent stand, of course under the Chinese threat.
In sum, the Anti-secession Law — rather than being primarily a non-peaceful law — reinforces China’s stand on maintaining status quo on Cross-Strait relations.
The US offer to sell F16s and F18s to India, announced on March 25, has to be seen in context. True, this initiative is linked to the White House decision to lift the ban on supplying F16s to Pakistan and the more cynical view is that the US manufacturers of these aircraft will now laugh all the way to the bank as the sub-continent gets sucked into an arms race.
This black-and-white reduction is misleading. The US has offered India these aircraft as part of its radically new policy towards South Asia and this re-orientation is significant. The other elements include co-operation in nuclear energy and safety, space and high technology commerce, as also access to the US military industrial complex. This is being undertaken to enable India to become a credible world power and clearly the new Bush template has accorded Delhi a certain salience in the concert of democracies. If these statements of intent are implemented with determination, then India-US relations will note March 25 as a major punctuation.
The new Bush policy for the sub-continent has been crafted to advance US interests, and this is to be expected. But, in the emerging regional and global systemic, an economically prosperous and militarily strong India is perceived to be in the US' larger interests. The package that includes nuclear energy co-operation and the sale of military hardware is the means to this end. Given the fact that India and the US had widely divergent perceptions of their security interests during the Cold War decades, there is a great deal of wariness about the 'other' on both sides.
The F16 itself has become a symbol of contestation between India, the US and Pakistan since it was originally denied to Islamabad for multiple transgressions by the Pak military establishment. There is little to suggest that the Pakistan GHQ has either atoned or recanted or allowed genuine democracy to take roots and to that extent the US decision to resume the supply of F16s is deemed to be perfidious.
It merits repetition that India is not in a position to radically influence the short-term objectives that the Bush team has prioritised by way of the war against terror and the capture of bin Laden. Against this, it would be prudent for India to accept the US offer for closer strategic co-operation in an objective manner and nurture shared interests. Trust grows gradually in any bi-lateral relationship and the US offer to India to enter into what is termed the NSSP — the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership — is unique and indicative of how the Bush team perceives India. Delhi has to decide when and how to get its feet wet and the F16 may turn out to be an unintended catalyst.
This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric. Therefore, considerable work still needs to be done before the much discussed strategic partnership can become a reality
The Afghan war is far from over. With the political process that began in December 2001 having completed three years, it is pertinent to revisit and examine the course of the post-Taliban Afghan politics. Afghanistan’s attempt to move towards peace and democracy has been perilous and remains so. The ouster of the Taliban and subsequent signing of the Bonn Agreement at the end of 2001 marked yet another turning point in the long-drawn Afghan conundrum. The tragic events of 9/11, which led to the consequential Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by the United States, not only displaced the Taliban, but also reengaged the US in Afghanistan leading a ‘coalition of the willing’. The political revival of the mujahideen, who have come to play a dominant role in the post-Taliban politics, and the reworking of the US-mujahideen synergy, a prominent aspect of the US’ anti-Soviet game plan in Afghanistan during the Cold War era, are other remarkable features. Having elected a president, Afghanistan is gearing up for a wider electoral exercise – parliamentary and local elections are due in September 2005. The paper suggests that in the backdrop of rising violence, socio-political polarisation, scarcity of funds, booming poppy production, warlordism and inadequate logistics, the elections alone will not serve the objectives of the Bonn process. In the absence of effective institutions of governance and the attention deficit of the international community, Afghanistan will continue to be at odds with the Bonn-mandated political and economic reforms being attempted there.
Four times since Pakistan’s creation, the Baloch, who never wanted to be part of Pakistan, have rebelled, demanding autonomy or an independent state. After three decades, Balochistan is in turmoil again; the Baloch rebels have been targeting the government institutions with impunity. The insurgents appear well versed in military craft as well as appear to be flush with arms and ammunition. An insurgency of this magnitude cannot be sustained without any external assistance. This paper attempts to analyse the foreign hand in Balochistan.
The end of the Cold War witnessed a realignment of equations amongst states to adapt to the changed world order. Within its ‘Look East’ policy, India initiated an economic engagement with its extended eastern neighbourhood to generate political trust and eventually forge multifaceted bonds. Due to the salience of Southeast Asia in geo-strategic terms, cooperation among maritime security forces has lately become imperative to respond to transnational security threats and realise common politico-strategic objectives. It is therefore important to identify the complementarities in that direction and explore avenues for cooperation in terms of coordinated operations. Such engagement would serve not only to enhance interoperability, but also further strengthen confidence at the political level and hence among the maritime forces.
Water resources continue to attract considerable attention and have increasingly become a significant feature of the world security environment. In order to locate water in the security continuum, it is necessary to revisit the debate on the traditional and non-traditional aspects of security. On the one hand, notions and images often conjured up when water issue is highlighted are often associated with concerns like national survival, inter and intra-state tension and the likelihood of “water wars”– the ‘securitisation’ of water. On the other hand, the security discourse also examines the necessity to ‘desecuritise’ waterrelated problems so as to reduce perception of threat and facilitate negotiations.
On May 17, 2005, the Federal Interior Ministry of Germany published its annual report on the Protection of Constitution for 2004. For the last few years, the country’s domestic intelligence agency – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) – under the Federal Interior Ministry, has been publishing such reports on its website. Focusing on the internal security situation of Germany, the recent report includes external threats, indigenous left and right-wing groups, their potential for violence, foreign terrorist and militant groups active in Germany and the presence of foreign intelligence services on German soil. On the occasion of the publication, German Federal Minister of Interior Otto Schily warned that Islamic terrorism poses the greatest global threat as well as for Germany. Highlighting the slight increase (from 30,950 in 2003 to 31,800 in 2004) in the membership strength of Islamist organisations in Germany, he emphasised the need to ban the existing organisations and their activities as an effective instrument to combat the threat.1
The significance of Germany in the post -9/11 global scenario needs little reiteration. The unearthing of the fact that Hamburg was the birthplace of the conspiracy to attack US civil and military installations on 9/11, the arrests of some key terrorists in Germany and their subsequent trials have indeed evoked global interest. As counter-measures to tackle the terrorist threat on its own soil, Germany has already approved two security packages in order to enable its security apparatus to meet the new challenge. Three Islamist organisations have been banned as a part of the process. The Caliphate State, essentially a Turkish diaspora-based organisation with its headquarters in Cologne, was banned in December 2001. After a protracted legal tussle, the leader of the organisation, Metin Kaplan, was extradited to Turkey in October 2004. Likewise, in August 2002, the German Interior Ministry prohibited the activities of the Aachen-based charity Al Aqsa, accused of collecting funds for the Hamas. German agencies have also been watching the propaganda initiatives and other related activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party for Islamic Liberation). The German chapter of the global Islamic organisation Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) through its propaganda literature and especially through its German website, www.explizit-islam.de, has not only been propagating its radical Islamic agenda but also its virulent anti-Israel, anti-West worldview. Interestingly, HuT’s anti-Semitic and anti-US ideological standpoint is shared by the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). In January 2003, Germany prohibited HuT and its website was closed. In December 2004, German agencies also foiled a suicide attack on the visiting Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in Berlin. Two members of the organisation Ansar al-Islam were arrested in this connection.2
However, it is noteworthy that for the first time a global Islamic movement, Tabligh-e-Jama’at (Community of Preaching and Mission), basically a South Asian movement, is mentioned in the Annual Report of 2004. Under the category of other foreign Islamist organisations active in Germany, the report specifically mentions the considerable increase in its support base (present strength: 450).3 Under the rubric of ‘Foreign Extremist Efforts Ominous to Security’, the report describes the root of the Tabligh-e-Jama’at, its activities and the threat potential for Germany. Though the report admits that the Tabligh-e-Jama’at presents itself as apolitical and refutes violence in principle, however given the movement’s rigid interpretation of Islam and its global reach, the possibility of Islamist groups instrumentalising the structure of the movement cannot be ruled out.4
The significance of the Tabligh-e-Jama’at citation in the Annual Report of a European intelligence agency is manifold. Prior to this, European agencies have observed the activities of various traditional militant, terrorist or separatist South Asia based-organisations active in Europe – for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and Harkatul- Mujahideen. In 2000, the UK, following the US, prohibited some of the abovementioned organisations. Because of political developments in South Asia, activities of traditional organisations like LTTE or ISYF are almost frozen in Europe. In consonance with the trend of previous years, the strength of the LTTE in Germany has stagnated (about 750 from 2001 to 2004).5 However, in the post-9/11 environment, security agencies have started to vigorously investigate, locate and expose various terrorist groups and sleeper cells throughout Europe. The general awareness about the threat to European society and legal order has begun to increase. Realising the public mood after 9/11, radical Islamic groups in Europe, whose shrill anti-West, anti-US, Jihadi rhetoric were a daily feature, either toned down or changed their techniques.
The year 2004 was a milestone in the domestic security situation in Europe. Terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 , in Madrid claiming 191 lives highlighted the capability of terrorist sleeper cells to conspire and target civilians on such a large scale. On November 2, 2004, Theo van Gogh, the controversial Dutch filmmaker, was brutally killed in Amsterdam. Mohammad Bouyeri, 26, a Dutch-Moroccan alleged to be a member of a radical Islamic network in the Netherlands, is facing charge in this connection before a Dutch court. The killing of Van Gogh and subsequent attacks on mosques in Dutch cities, point to the delicate nature of inter-community relations in the Netherlands. Madrid and Amsterdam also underscored the need for continuing the ongoing governmental efforts to tackle the present perceived threat. On their part, European agencies have been successful in prosecuting some key terrorists, masterminds or indoctrinators in Europe or extraditing them to their countries of origin.
Europe has clearly recognised the fact that the threat from global radical Islamic movements is not just external. Continuous propaganda in print outlets and in websites of these Europe-based Islamist organisations has now found its target audience in the second-and third generation of Muslim immigrants. Lack of education, poor integration of these young Muslims in the European societies, high rates of unemployment, crime and drug abuse, generation gap and a simplistic interpretation of international affairs by these global Islamic movements or indoctrinators are the contributing factors of the growing radical trend amongst young Muslims in Europe.
It is, therefore, noteworthy that European security agencies have been trying to study the origin, evolution, arrival in Europe and modus operandi of global Islamic movements. These movements apparently seem to be non-violent and apolitical but their ultimate aim is to establish a global Caliphate based on an all encapsulating Islam. The identification of the Tabligh-e-Jama’at by European agencies signifies that the agencies are attempting to have an understanding of global Islamic movements originating not only from the conflict zones of West Asia but from South Asia as well. As the General Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD) of the Netherlands says in its comments upon the Tabligh-e-Jama’at: “In the Western world the view is winning ground that deeper study is necessary into the exclusivism and parallelism advocated by these groups.”6
Tabligh-e-Jama’at in Europe
In 1927, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalwi (1885-1944) founded the Tabligh-e-Jama’at at Mewat near Delhi. As an offshoot of the Deobandi School, the movement extended its influence in the whole subcontinent. Every year, their annual congregations (ijetma) are held in Bhopal (India), Tongi near Dhaka (Bangladesh) and Raiwind near Lahore (Pakistan). Observers who have witnessed these annual assemblies opine that these are very large gatherings of followers only comparable with the annual pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca. Leading political figures of Bangladesh and Pakistan (like former Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar) are followers of the movement.7 It has members in the Pakistan Armed Forces and its preachers are allowed to deliver sermons in Pakistani army installations. Insofar as religious activities of Tabligh-e-Jama’at are concerned, it is a pietistic and proselytising movement. It underscores the need for reawakening the faith of the Muslims and its followers pledge to travel in order to enrol new members. Some of the new recruits are sent to the Tabligh-run madrasas in Pakistan for further training.
Historically, after the partition of India and particularly in the 1960s, a large number of Muslim immigrants from South Asia arrived in Britain and settled near big British cities like Bradford and Manchester. As per the British Census of 2001, people of Pakistani origin constitute the largest minority group (14.5 per cent) in Bradford and Muslims are the second-largest religious group (16.1 per cent) in this city. Manchester has 100,000 Asian Muslim settlers out of which 20,000 are from Pakistan.8 Establishment of the European headquarters of Tabligh-e-Jama’at in the British town of Dewsbury, close to both Bradford and Manchester, may therefore be seen from the context of a higher density of South Asian immigrants. Since 1968, Tabligh-e-Jama’at has been active in France. Apart from its headquarters at the Ar-Rahma mosque near Paris, it is also active in Lile, Marseille, Mulhouse and Dreux.9 In Germany, the adherents of Tabligh-e-Jama’at use the mosques in Munich, Nürnberg, Erfurt and Cologne. In 1977, the Tabligh-e- Jama’at started its activities in Norway amongst Pakistanis and Moroccans.10 Broadly speaking, Tabligh-e-Jama’at in Europe has been working among poor South Asian and Maghreb guest workers11 and through their annual gatherings at Dewsbury.
Alcoholic Anonymous or an Obscurantist Sect?
As already mentioned, the Dutch AIVD in its study has characterised the activities of movements like Tabligh-e-Jama’at in Europe as exclusivist and parallelist. Exclusivism here denotes the trend of a general aloofness of Muslims in the European host societies. They have less interest in local and national politics and refuse to integrate into the mainstream of European societies. There exists among them, a general attitude towards their countries of residence as a temporary halt, from where they would eventually return. Parallelism, on the contrary, refers to the idea of establishing an alternate society, i.e., a transplanted version of their countries of origin with rituals, religious practices and mosques in a foreign land. If extended or as propagated by the global Islamic movements, this idea of parallelism may eventually lead to parallel Muslim societies (totally based on the literal interpretation of Islamic texts by these global Islamic movements) in a predominantly Christian setting. In the long run, such parallelism will result in greater division and ghettoisation in European societies solely on the basis of religion.
As far as an exclusivist movement like Tabligh-e-Jama’at is concerned and the immediate threat of proliferation by the terrorist networks to use its ranks, it must be noted that the characterisation of this movement oscillates from one extreme to another. Barbara D. Metcalf compares this movement with Alcoholic Anonymous, which implies that the basic aim of the movement is for self-improvement of an individual by spiritual blessings.12 On the contrary, Soheib Bencheikh, the grand Mufti of Marseille in France, terms the movement as an obscurantist sect, which is ravaging the Muslim youth in France.13 Alex Alexiev, a terrorism expert with the Center for Security Policy in the US describes the Tabligh-e-Jama’at as “Jihad’s stealthy legions”.14 This kind of diverse interpretation of a single movement arises out of the ambivalent nature of such Islamic movements active in various Muslim diaspora in Europe. The AIVD correctly observes: “…Dawa (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology)-oriented groups often make ambiguous comments about the legitimacy of the armed Jihad in areas where Muslims are oppressed and persecuted (for example, Kashmir, Chechnya or recently, Iraq).”15 It should also be added that the influence of the preaching of Tabligh-e-Jama’at to join the armed Jihad in different parts of the world cannot be totally excluded as it is already highlighted in some instances that Western Jihadis (like the American Taliban John Walker Lindh who fought in Afghanistan) were indeed influenced by the preaching of this movement. This kind of threat perception of religious indoctrination is also shared in the annual report of the German Intelligence, when it forewarns that intensive training courses for the selectively recruited members of the Tablighe- Jama’at at the Quranic schools in Pakistan are suitable for indoctrination and also make the participants susceptible to Islamist positioning.
Conclusion
It is premature to come to a definitive conclusion on whether the Tabligh-e- Jama’at does really encourage Jihad, because primarily it is an amorphous movement and not a hierarchical organisation. A consultative council of senior members runs its European headquarters at Dewsbury. As the movement avoids the media and prefers to work quietly, it is also difficult to analyse its ultimate aim and tactics. However, it is clear that the target of the perceived radical elements in this movement is the second-and third generation South Asians in Europe. The prevailing demographic trend in Europe and the need for immigration are also indicative that more immigrants are expected to arrive in Europe from South Asia and North Africa in the coming decades. A UN study predicts that even if 0.6 million immigrants arrive in Europe between 2000 and 2050, the European population would nevertheless decrease by 96 million during the same period.16 A majority of these immigrants would be Muslims. Already, Islam is the secondlargest and fastest-growing religion in Europe. These global Islamic movements will, therefore, definitely compete with each other to extend their support base.
However, these radical Islamic organisations and movements have also some inherent drawbacks. First of all, prior to and especially after 9/11, the open support by some of these Europe-based groups to the terrorist attacks in US brought them not only under the scanner of European intelligence agencies but attracted global attention. In this scenario, their overt propaganda and sufficient space for manoeuvrings are already restricted. Because of an attentive European media, it is also difficult for them to exploit religious gatherings like the Friday prayers in the mosques to disseminate their propaganda. Coordination at the level of the European Union also poses obstacles for them to exploit the free movement within the Schengen area. Second, these movements are themselves divided on ethnic lines in composition, leadership issue, theological debate and about their ultimate goal and present tactics.
The growing awareness within the Muslim communities already settled in Europe is also an impediment. During the last decade, there has been a concerted attempt to form a European Muslim community leadership with whom at least a dialogue can be started on integration, assimilation and multiculturalism in respective European societies. Encouragement from the government side may differ from nation to nation, however the importance of the issue is accepted even in the European Security Strategy. As the dialogue between the moderate Muslim community and the governments is a two-way process, both sides are expected to communicate and formulate innovative methods to counter the challenge of religious indoctrination and counter-integration theses by these global Islamic movements.
The British parliamentary elections in May 2005 are a sign of progress in this regard wherein the Muslim community enthusiastically participated in the whole process. In the case of Germany, it will be interesting to observe as to how the Muslim community will participate in the coming national elections, to be held in September 2005. Germany has a total Muslim population of 3.3 million, out of which 732,000 possess a German passport.17 However, like in other European countries, the Muslim community in Germany is also divided on the basis of ethnicity as well as on denomination. For instance, the Ahmadiyas, who are mostly refugees from Pakistan, are a 50,000 strong community. The Alevites, who are mainly from Turkey, number 4,00,000. Both these groups are considered by the major Muslim sects in Germany as ‘heretics’ and seen with disdain.18 Considering this social divide, it will be instructive to study the voting pattern of the Muslim communities, especially where the community forms a considerable mass of the electorate, like Berlin-Kreuzberg. It is also expected that during the electoral campaign in the coming months, the issue of Islam, Muslim communities and their role in Germany will be thoroughly deliberated upon.
References/End Notes
- 1. Statement Bundesinnenminister Otto Schily zum Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 am 17. Mai 2005 in Berlin, at http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_122688/Internet/ Content/Nachrichten/Pressemitteilungen/200505Schily__Statement_ Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004.html; For English version, see “The Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily presents 2004 Report on the Protection of the Constitution: Banning existing associations and their activities proves particularly effective”, May 20, 2005, at http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_148134/Internet/Content/ Nachrichten/Pressemitteilungen/2005/05Annual__Report__Protection__of__the__ Constitution__2004.html
- 2. For a detailed reference on the measures taken by the German Government after September 11, see Nach dem 11. September 2001, Maßnahmen gegen den Terror, Berlin; German Ministry of Interior, March 2004.
- 3. Annual Report on the Protection of Constitution for 2004, Advance version in German, p. 190.
- 4. Ibid, pp. 247-48.
- 5. Ibid, pp. 246-47. Total number of Tamils residing in Germany is estimated at 50,000.
- 6. From Dawa to Jihad: The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), The Hague, The Netherlands, p. 38.
- 7. Yoginder Sikand, “The Tablighi Jama’at and Politics”, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) Newsletter, 13, December 2003, Leiden, The Netherlands, pp. 42-43.
- 8. Refer, Pnina Werbner, “Sufi Cults, Intimate Relations and National Pakistani Networking in Britain”, in Jamal Malik (ed.) Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre, LIT Verlag, Munich, 2004, p. 228.
- 9. For a detailed research refer, Jean-Yves Camus, “Islam in France”, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, May 10, 2004, p. 11, at http://www.ict.org.il/
- 10. Kari Vogt, “Immigration through Islam? Muslims in Norway”, in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 93.
- 11. Refer, Guido Steinberg, Der Islamismus im Niedergang? Anmerkungen zu den Thesen Gilles Kepels, Olivier Roys und zur europäischen Islamismusforschung in Islamismus, German Federal Ministry of Interior, Berlin, 3rd Edition, 2004, p. 35.
- 12. Barbara D. Metcalf, “Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs”, ISIM, pp. 8-12.
- 13. John Vincour, “Mufti of Marseille Calls for Resistance to Forces that Encourage Fundamentalism: A Progressive Muslim Struggles to Be Heard”, International Herald Tribune, November 30, 2001.
- 14. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions”, Middle East Quarterly, January 2005.
- 15. See From Dawa to Jihad, no. 6, p. 27. Italics added.
- 16. “Europe needs more immigrants”, EUObserver, November 30, 2004.
- 17. Religionen in Deutschland, REMID Survey, as on May 11, 2005.
- 18. For an authoritative work on the intra-Muslim discourse in Germany see, Claudia Dantschke, Freiheit geistig-politischer Auseinandersetzung – islamistischer Druck auf zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure in Islamismus, German Federal Ministry of Interior, Berlin, 3rd Edition, 2004, pp. 103-32.
The one-armed picture of Lord Nelson, perhaps the most celebrated and eulogised of British seafarers, is synonymous with the victory at Trafalgar and the bicentennial celebrations of this famous sea battle began on June 28 with an International Fleet Review in the Solent off south England. India apart, the 35 participating navies include the French and Spanish navies who were defeated by Nelson’s superior skills in that decisive battle on October 21, 1805.
2005 is a maritime year of multiple import. Apart from the bicentennial of Trafalgar, it also marks the centennial of the 1905 Russo-Japan War that is symbolised by the Tsushima Strait battle, which marked the emergence of Japan as a credible military power. And lower down the temporal scale, this year also marks the 60th anniversary of the end of Second World War and the maritime dimension of that six-year saga has many naval punctuations that straddle the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
Trafalgar, Tsushima and the transmutation of naval power in the 21st century has a certain resonance with the emerging global strategic systemic and the choices that India has to make at the national level and the concomitant extrapolation to the Indian Navy. This aspect acquires greater salience in the run-up to the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in mid-July and the proposed scope of the India- US military relationship.
It is a tenet of security studies that great power status has always moved in tandem with credible naval/maritime capability and that the British Empire – on which the sun never set – was predicated on the Royal Navy (RN) keeping control of relevant oceanic areas and vital choke points. While popular perception associates the RN with ‘sodomy and rum’ – in reality, for over a century, the RN provided the muscle to ensure that the global mercantile dynamism of the period was facilitated by a safe and low threat environment at sea. The non-state pirating, plundering and slave trafficking that was rampant at the time was brought under firm check – albeit with the appropriate realpolitik underpinning – and gradually a consensus emerged among the major powers about how good order at sea would be maintained so that the burgeoning rhythms of trade, commerce and colonialism could be sustained.
Reviewing the long cycle of history, naval historians aver that the turn of the 21st century is similar to that of the 18th in that the principal threat from sea, of the anterior period was neutralised or disappeared. The current analogy is that with the end of the Cold War, major navies now have to re-tool and justify their platforms and budgetary support to sceptical national treasury mandarins. Countries like India did not have to worry about the ultimate nuclear Armageddon at sea, for in the Cold War decades the primary maritime focus was the Atlantic-Pacific combine where nuclear submarines and aircraft carrier battle groups stalked each other for months on end.
The anomalous Cold War is now relegated to history and with it the probability of major naval battles a la Trafalgar and Tsushima. The more likely and visible maritime threat is of the low intensity conflict-maritime terrorism (LIC-MT) variant. Even the world’s most powerful navy is not immune to such threats as the October 2000 terrorist attack on USS Cole demonstrated. More recently, the 9/11 experience in the US and the related WMD anxiety has heightened these fears and the exigency of non-state disruption of the global maritime mercantile and energy rhythms is the dreaded worst-case scenario.
Thus, navies represent the lower end of national strategic capability. But, yet another tenet of international relations is that there is a dominant constituency in the long cycle of history wherein nations that have the appropriate capability evolve a matrix of strategic equipoise. Hence in the colonial period, while the European powers beginning with Iberia (Portugal and Spain) battled among themselves, a consensus was arrived at to consolidate European supremacy – till it was challenged by the US at the turn of the 20th century.
Currently, the US leads the pack of comprehensive naval capability – strategic deterrent, trans-border ordnance delivery, multiple ocean surveillance and sustained presence with troop-lift capability – and no other nation can aspire to this profile in the near future. Global maritime strategic focus in its spatial scope has shifted from the Cold War combine of the Atlantic-Pacific to the Pacific-Indian Ocean and the relevant Asian navies are yet to evolve an appropriate multilateral framework. The major credible naval powers in the Asian matrix are Japan, China and India and while Tokyo is already part of the US military alliance and Beijing is yet to assert its naval muscle, Delhi by virtue of its existential characteristics is the most relevant naval power in the Indian Ocean.
For India, its nascent nuclear weapon capability and the modest but proven naval profile represent two ends of the national strategic quiver and it is imperative that they are husbanded with rectitude and perceived as being part of the global strategic management grid. Consequently, the tacit acceptance of India’s nuclear status and aspirations by the US augurs well and hopefully this will be further cemented during the PM’s July visit. It is the naval dimension that still lacks the appropriate politico-military underpinning and a recall of the historical trajectory is instructive.
The core partnership or alliance of every long cycle of history, since the advent of the sail to nuclear propulsion has been largely naval/maritime. As Modelski and Thompson point out in their authoritative survey Sea Power in Global Politics: “The primary cases are the Portuguese-Spanish working arrangement for the ‘division’ of the world (1494) and subsequently, for controlling access to it through coordinated naval patrol measures from the 1520s onwards; the Anglo-Dutch alliance in two global wars, and finally the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ of the 20th century cemented in the Second World War.”
The global strategic systemic is currently in a state of flux and the US predicament in Iraq, the trans-Atlantic tension, intra Europe dissonance, the footprint of terrorism and China’s ‘peaceful rise’ are all case in point. India has to evolve a calibrated approach in defining its own relevance to this turbulent systemic and it merits repetition that linear extrapolations from history are invalid. However, it is nobody’s case that India become militarily ‘aligned’ with the US or confront China in Asia.
What is necessary is that India ‘align’ its strategic military capabilities with its inexorable and abiding national interests. While the nuclear determinant will continue to be nettlesome – given the sensitivities that other nations still harbour (as senior US officials who visited Delhi on the eve of the PM’s Washington visit have indicated) – the naval dimension is a doable activity at the India-US bilateral level. The military subaltern of the Cold War is no longer valid and Delhi will not forget the purple prose invective preferred by Nixon-Kissinger during 1971 that has just come to light as part of the release of archival material.
But the essence of Trafalgar in 1805 is not so much Nelson’s daring victory as the astute manner in which a military advantage was converted into an abiding facilitator of the British national interest. Japan misread the tea leaves in 1905 and India would do well to introspect over this niche of salty history.
Space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of preeminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theatre of war.
President John F. Kennedy, Address to Rice University, September 12, 1962
The Bush Administration is preparing a shift in US policy to allow for protection of existing and futuristic space assets. Convinced by the logic of securing space to deter probable attack, the US Air Force has sought Presidential approval for a national security directive. The official view of the Air Force is that since the US depends so crucially on space capabilities, it must, remain prepared to confront adversaries on the high ground of space. Correspondingly, the Department of Defence (DoD) is outlining a new policy which may just stop short of putting weapons into outer space. However, according to a New York Times report,1 the Bush Administration is close to implementing a new space policy that could move the US closer to placing offensive and defensive weapons in space.
If implemented, the Bush directive would be a radical departure from the one articulated by Clinton in 1996, which concentrated more towards peaceful uses of space technologies. From a military perspective, Clinton emphasised a less aggressive use of space. It involved spy satellites support for military operations, arms control and non-proliferation pacts. In contrast, the new policy is expected to not only call for militarising space but also talk of having free access in space for protecting US space assets. The global reaction has largely been one of concern and dismay. Many analysts feel that the US proposed space policy would pave the way for deployment of both defensive and offensive weapons in space. The Bush Administration, however will face opposition from its allies and potential enemies alike.
Russia has already reacted very strongly to this proposal. Its senior counsellor in the Washington embassy stated, “We intend to work through diplomatic channels to urge the US not to move towards fielding weapons in space. But, if diplomacy fails then we will not hesitate to react possibly with force if the US successfully puts ‘combat weapons’ in the space.”2 Russia has voluntarily declared in the past that it will not be the first to weaponise space and thwart the US from its desire to pursuing any such plans. Also, the scientific community within the US, convinced that the move would be prohibitively expensive and could trigger an uncalled for arms race, has warned against putting weapons in space. Indeed, any future deployment of space weapons is expected to face financial, technological, political and diplomatic hurdles.
On the domestic front, the Democrats are likely to resist any move towards space weaponisation as it would tantamount to overruling the Clinton policy. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Bush Administration is convinced about its space policies and will not hesitate to go the extra mile to achieve its desired objective. The US administration is of the opinion that new threats to its satellites have emerged since the space doctrine was last reviewed in 1996 and that its space assets must be protected at all costs. It has been argued that since significant changes have occurred over the last decade or so with some countries taking greater interest in space and in possession of technologies that can threaten US space systems, an updated space policy is the need of the hour.
Both the Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) and the Afghanistan conflict proved to a great extent that space observations are an integral part of modern day conflict. Space is considered as the fourth dimension of the warfare. In both the wars, the US space-based assets had the asymmetric advantage over their enemy particularly in the arena of reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and navigation. Now, it appears that the Bush Administration wants to enhance this asymmetry further by putting offensive and defensive weapons into outer space.
The base document for this forthcoming space directive is a January 2001 report of a national commission (headed by Donald Rumsfeld) on the use of space for national security needs, which has recommended that the military should ‘ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons in space’. In fact, Rumsfeld fears that ‘space could be the next Pearl Harbour for the US’. In 2002, after weighing the report of the Rumsfeld space commission, President Bush withdrew from the 30-year-old Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Russia, which banned space-based weapons.
The ABM treaty barred the placement of not only missile defence components (such as radars) in space but also of space based weapons (such as conventional kinetic energy kill vehicles (KKVs) or space based lasers (SBLs) intended to intercept warheads or rockets. The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 had sounded the alarm bells about its intent. Now Pentagon officials admit that the air force’s determination to field space weapons had also been accelerated by its failure to build an earth-based missile defence system after 22-years and nearly $100 billion in expenditure. Presently, it appears that the US is planning to take this bold initiative because it is aware that it can work this out within the gamut of existing UN treaties on this issue. It sees no need for new space arms-control agreements. The US is already party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits only stationing weapons of mass destruction in space and presently no treaty exists to deal with other methods of weaponising the space. Technically, the US cannot be faulted on their proposed space agenda.
The militarisation of space is not a simple mission. It will require new weapons, new satellites, and more importantly hundreds of billions of dollars. The US has had space-based weapon systems on its drawing board for years, including miniature satellites that can attack other satellites, high-powered lasers, and even a space plane that can drop weapons from orbit. Some are expected to be ready for deployment in about 18 months. The space weapons debate began in earnest in the late 1960s, after the US and USSR tested their first anti-satellite systems in 1959 and 1968, respectively. Subsequently, the issue lost steam and particularly after the end of Cold War, it was expected that weaponisation of space would never become a reality. The recent demand by the US Air Force brings the issue back to centre-stage. It appears that the administration may be toying with an idea of making space the battleground of the future. The Bush Administration understands that no immediate threat to its space assets is in the offing from any nation-state. Also, no terrorist organisation is at present capable of posing a threat to the space assets. Clearly, US intentions of exploring the possibility of space weaponisation emerge out of its futuristic concerns.
It is interesting to note that the Rumsfeld commission came into being much before 9/11. When Rumsfeld voiced an opinion that “space could be America’s next Pearl Harbour” he was referring to space as a soft underbelly of the US. Apart from Russia, the US is chary of China. Over the last few years, China has been diligently developing its space infrastructure with greater emphasis on indigenous technology and has emerged as a force to reckon with in ‘military space’. Reports indicate that China has completed ground tests for an advanced anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon called ‘Parasitic Satellite’.
China is developing ASAT systems with both long and short-term strategic objectives. The long-term objectives are probably to break the US monopoly in this field. China understands that compared to the US, it lags far behind in terms of assets and technology in the space arena and hence the best way to challenge the sole space superpower is to possess offensive anti-space-based weapons. It is also in the process of building lasers to destroy satellites.
China, quite clearly, is doing a balancing act on the space front. Overtly, it is spearheading an international movement to ban conventional weapons from space along with Russia and few other countries. At the same time, as reports suggest, it is discretely developing anti-space-based technology and formulating tactics in order to target American military assets.3 China understands the critical advantage the US had in the 1991 Gulf War as well as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the recent war in Iraq. China’s PLA feels that if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan theatre, then it can neutralise or destroy US space assets, and deny the Pentagon the asymmetric advantage in space.
Russia, in contrast, even though it has a history of development of ASAT systems, continues to respect the ASAT weapon-testing moratorium which begun in 1983. However, if the need arises, Russia is capable of developing ASAT technologies within a short period of time. Although no new-dedicated ASAT programmes has been initiated by the US in the recent past, the Bush Administration is increasing funding for research and developments in related technologies. According to some reports, the Pentagon has already spent billions of dollars developing space weapons and preparing plans to deploy them.4
It appears that apart from the Chinese and Russian concerns, the US is convinced that weaker nations also may carry out surprise attacks in space to neutralise the big powers’ nuclear war-fighting advantages. Hence, the best way to secure US interests in space is a planned transition from space superiority to space dominance.
The Bush Administration has made arrangements in the defence budget for space-based weapons to defend satellites, strike ground targets and defend against missile attacks. However, the major hurdle in getting the new space initiative off the ground would be convincing Congress to approve its enormous price tag, which is tentatively estimated at between $220 billion and one trillion dollars. If Bush manages to pass this hurdle successfully, then it could be the beginning of the biggest and costliest space arms race in the post-Cold War era.
References/End notes
- 1. New York Times, May 18, 2005. See http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/ 0518-02.htm
- 2. “Russia urges US to avoid space arms race”, Financial Times, May 18, 2005.
- 3. Larry Wortzel, “China War on Space-Based Weapons,” August 31, 2003, at capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3034
- 4. Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for space weapons programs”. The New York Times, May 18, 2005
